An important set of questions in economics concern how changes in the distribution of economic parameters (income, wealth, productivity, distortions, information, etc.) impact individual choices and market outcomes. We currently do not have tools to answer such questions. In this paper, I develop a theory of distributional comparative statics that addresses this set of issues. Central to the developments is a new concept called strategic risk-aversion which determines the outcome of most distributional comparative statics exercises. As illustrations I analyze the relationship between savings and inequality, ask how risk influences agents' behavior in Bayesian games, and study concavity of policy functions in general stochastic dynamic programming problems.
Introduction
Comparative statics results such as the implicit function theorem and monotonicity theorems (Topkis (1978) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , and Quah (2007) ) provide conditions under which an optimization problem's endogenous variables increase or decrease when exogenous variables change.
Such results are of course immensely valuable for economics where they form the backbone of predictive analysis. But they generally do not enable us to predict how the distribution of economic parameters (income, wealth, productivity, distortions, information, etc.) impact individual choices and market outcomes. In this paper, I develop a framework and tools for addressing such distributional comparative statics questions. Through a number of applications I show how the tools can be applied in a variety of partial equilibrium as well as general/Nash equilibrium settings. For example, I investigate under what conditions an increase in income inequality will increase or decrease aggregate savings and societal welfare in a competitive economy; and I study increased uncertainty in Bayesian games and ask whether countries locked in an arms race become more or less aggressive in equilibrium if their environments becomes more risky. Central to the developments is a new concept called strategic risk-aversion which determines the outcome of most distributional comparative statics exercises. What is more, an easily verifiable condition on the the primitives of an optimization problem called quasi-concave differences, is shown to imply strategic risk-aversion, leading to a fully tractable theory of distributional comparative statics on par with standard comparative statics methods as the ones mentioned above.
Since most of the intuition behind my results is captured by strategic risk-aversion, let me begin by describing that concept and its relationship with distributional comparative statics. To this end, consider the following simple question:
An individual with a variable income stream makes donations to charity. In any given year, he chooses the donation x which maximizes his payoff u (x , z ) where z is that year's income. Does greater variability in income reduce or increase average charity donations?
As I will now explain, the key to distributional comparative statics lies in the answer to this question. Note firstly that the agent in this example has no influence over the risk he is subjected to and, secondly, that he is allowed to choose his donation after the state z is announced. Formally, z is a random variable with distribution η, and the agent's optimal decisions can be described by an optimal policy, i.e., a (measurable) mapping g : Z → X such that u (g (z ), z ) = max x ∈X u (x , z ) for almost every z ∈ Z . This formalism precisely captures the idea that agents can condition on risk ex-post and so respond strategically to it, in particular in the charity donation setting g (z ) is the donation in a year with income z . 1 This setting is not to be confused with the framework of Athey (2002) , Kimball (1990) , and many others where agents commit to a (deterministic) strategy before the uncertainty is resolved (returned to in section 4). Nor is it to be confused with the conventional choice under uncertainty setting where agents choose the distribution η among a set of "lotteries" (returned to in a moment). Now, given an optimal policy g , the optimal strategy of the agent will be the random variable on the strategy set X determined by η's image measure under g . 2 Intuitively, the optimal strategy is the random variable whose realizations we observe in the real world when studying the agent. The expected value of this optimal strategy is:
η (g ) will from not on simply be referred to as the expected strategy. Note that in the example above, this is precisely the average charity donation, i.e., the average/mean strategy that such an agent will pursue if we repeatedly observe him. In an alternative interpretation η (g ) corresponds to the agent's ex ante expected action. For example, this is the relevant perspective from the point of view of the opponents in a Bayesian game. Finally, if we observe a set of agents once, η (g ) will be their mean action -an interpretation that plays an important role for certain distributional comparative statics questions as returned to below. I suggest that we call an agent strategically risk-averse if the expected strategy is non-increasing in the level of risk, or more formally: If η (g ) ≥ η (g ) wheneverη is a mean-preserving spread of η. Strategic risk-love and strategic riskneutrality are defined by reversing the inequality and replacing it with an equality sign, respectively.
The intuition is straight-forward: a strategically risk-averse agent becomes more "defensive" if she is subjected to greater risk; while a strategically risk-loving agent becomes more "aggressive". In the charity donation example, the average charity donation will consequently decrease if the agent is strategically risk-averse, and it will increase if the agent is strategically risk-loving (provided that we take increased income variability to mean increased risk in the mean-preserving spread sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) ).
Notice that compared with conventional expected utility theory, strategic risk-aversion is concerned with changes in the distribution of exogenously given states (drawn by "nature" or strategic opponents) whereas the conventional theory is concerned with the choice of a distribution/lottery.
In the previous example that would correspond to the agent choosing among different occupations (each occupation corresponding to a random income stream). If we fix an individual's charity donation x and define v (z ) = u (x , z ), the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility of η would be Z v (z )η(d z ). Crucially, whether the individual is risk-averse or risk-loving (v concave or convex) will in no way determine whether he is strategically risk-averse or strategically risk-loving. In particular, he may -for a fixed yearly donation -well experience an increase in utility when his income becomes less variable (in which case he would be risk-averse) but at the same time he may be strategically risk-loving and so end up lowering the average charity donation in response. 3 It is 2 That is to say, an optimal strategy is a measure on X with distribution given by η x (A) = η{z ∈ Z : g (z ) ∈ A} where A is a measurable subset of X .
3 Of course, it would also be possible to define expected utility in such a way that the strategic response is taken into account, namely as Z u (g (z ), z )η(d z ) (this in fact is the agent's expected payoff given the optimal policy g , see section 2). Now, if u is (jointly) concave and increasing, strategic risk-aversion is a sufficient condition for conventional riskaversion (concavity of v (z ) = u (g (z ), z )). But it is not a necessary condition; in particular, strategic risk-love is once again not until we understand this relationship between conventional and strategic risk-aversion that we understand how to approach distributional comparative statics. Since an agent is risk-averse if and only if the (Bernoulli) utility function v is concave, it is clear from the definition of strategic riskaversion that an agent will be strategically risk-averse [risk-loving, risk-neutral] if and only if the optimal policy g is concave [convex, linear] . Neither implies the other, so new tools are needed. Now, by the very definition of strategic risk-love/aversion/neutrality, these provide answers to a rather natural distributional comparative statics question, namely how increased uncertainty affects the expected/average strategy. In section 2, I show that the concepts' significance extend much further than that, however, determining the comparative statics of ex-post distributions as well as 
u (m (i ) − s (i )) + δu ((1 + r )s (i ))
In this situation, the optimal policy is the savings function g = g (m (i ), r ) which gives optimal savings g (m (i ), r ) as a function of income and the interest rate. 5 g in turn determines savingsper-capita for any given (frequency) distribution of income η (Note that this formulation does not require a continuum of agents, though this is of course allowed): 6
S η (r ) of course has the interpretation of savings by the mean/average individual so we can interpret S η (r ) as savings by a "representative agent" that can be integrated into standard economic set-ups such as OLG economies (section 5). The distribution of income η directly affects aggregate savings, which is in contrast to standard representative agent frameworks based on the Gorman conditions such as for example that of Caselli and Ventura (2000) . Now as for the distributional comparative statics question we set out to answer, if by "more unequal" we mean an increase in inequality in the Lorenz sense it is well known that savings-per-capita will be increasing [decreasing, unchanged] in inequality if and only if g is strictly convex [strictly concave, linear] in income (Atkinson (1970) ).
compatible with conventional risk-aversion. 4 Adopting here all of the standard assumptions, including monotonicity and separability. In addition, it is implicit in the following description that the solution is unique which holds if the payoff function is strictly quasi-concave. 5 The interest rate is here an exogenously given deterministic variable. With a random interest rate, each consumer's decision problem would be completely parallel to the charity donation example above.
6 If the set of agents , say, is finite, η(A) = #{i ∈ :m (i )∈A} # (the counting measure). If is a continuum, = [0, 1], say, then η(A) = λ{i ∈ [0, 1] : m (i ) ∈ A} where λ is the Lebesgue measure. With a finite number I ∈ of agents, aggregate savings is then obviously given by I S η (r ). In situations with a continuum of agents, savings per capita/mean savings is normally the aggregate variable of interest (see for example Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) ).
Looking at (2), the (mathematical) similarity with (1) immediately strikes us: savings-per-capita is just the expected/mean strategy of an individual agent who chooses savings conditioned on income randomly drawn from the distribution η. And therefore, the strategic attitude to risk (strategic riskaversion/love/neutrality) at the individual level will completely determine the distributional comparative statics outcome at the aggregate level (specifically, savings-per-capita will be decreasing in inequality if and only if the agents are strategically risk-averse). Thus by way of strategic riskaversion we can (i) understand the individual behavioral characteristics that drive the relationship between savings and inequality at the aggregate level, (ii) determine how inequality of opportunities (as measured by the distribution of income) affects the inequality of outcomes (as measured by the distribution of savings), and (iii) predict how inequality affects societal welfare (as measured by a utilitarian social welfare function, see section 2).
At this point, strategic risk-aversion and its importance for distributional comparative statics should be clear. But for this to lead to useful tools for applications, the precise relationship between strategic risk-aversion and the primitives of an economic model must be established. Not only is this important for checking if an agent is strategically risk-averse in concrete applications; it also takes us from the previous understanding of strategic risk-aversion to an understanding at a deeper "psychological" level. Since strategic risk-aversion is equivalent to concavity of the optimal policy, this raises the following technical question: Under what conditions on the primitives of an optimization problem will the optimal policy be concave (convex, linear)? The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to answer that question. The answer turns out to be intuitive:
While conventional risk-aversion and risk-love can be distinguished by whether a more "mixed" outcome lowers or raises an agent's total payoff; strategic risk-aversion and strategic risk-love can analogously be distinguished by whether a more "mixed" outcome lowers or raises the marginal payoff. Mathematically, the last statement is captured by two conditions which I call quasi-concave differences and quasi-convex differences. Quasi-concave/quasi-convex differences bear close resemblance with Topkis' notions of increasing and decreasing differences (Topkis (1978) ), and in fact the result I present in this paper can be seen as a "concavity analogue" to Topkis' theorem (Topkis' theorem yields an increasing optimal policy under increasing differences, my theorem yields a concave optimal policy under quasi-concave differences). 7 Crucially, quasi-concave differences can be characterized via derivatives (assuming those exist of course), which operationally puts the condition on an equal footing with, say, concavity (where we can use the Hessian criterion) or supermodularity/increasing differences (where we use the cross-partial derivatives test of Topkis (1978) ).
Verifying the conditions for quasi-convex/quasi-concave differences leads to explicit primitive conditions for strategic risk-aversion. For example, I show in section 5 that the savings function in the previous income-allocation problem will be strictly convex [strictly concave, linear] in income if and only if β (x ) = u (x )u (x ) (u (x )) 2 is strictly decreasing [strictly increasing, constant] in x , where β (x ) is 7 Although the proofs turn out to have nothing in common, there is a close parallel between conventional and strategic complementarity on the one hand, and conventional and strategic risk-aversion on the other. This is seen clearly by comparison with the explanation offered in the second paragraph on page 489 of Bulow et al. (1985) . It is also a major theme in section 3. the familiar prudence-to-risk-aversion ratio of Carroll and Kimball (1996) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept of strategic riskaversion and presents a number of results on its relationship with distributional comparative statics (theorem 1). Section 3 defines quasi-concave differences, discusses the definition, and shows that quasi-concave differences implies strategic risk-aversion. A detailed discussion of the assumptions and various extensions is placed in an appendix (section 8). Section 4 further develops the concept of strategic risk-aversion by integrating it into an incomplete information game and addresses the following distributional comparative statics question: how does increased uncertainty (decreased precision of private signals) affect the set of equilibria in a Bayesian game? A concrete example is also provided, namely the arms race game. Section 5 develops the inequality-savings example already discussed in some detail and integrates this into an overlapping generations framework a la Diamond (1965) . Lastly, section 6 establishes very general conditions for concavity of policy functions in stochastic dynamic programming problems. These results play an important role for various distributional comparative statics questions in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (Huggett (2004) , Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) ). As a concrete application, the section extends and generalizes a contribution by Carroll and Kimball (1996) to the Aiyagari (1994) type setting with borrowing constraints.
Strategic Risk-Aversion
In the theory of choice under uncertainty, an agent is said to be risk-averse if his expected utility decreases with risk. Analogously, an agent who can condition his actions on the realization of a random variable is strategically risk-averse if the expected strategy is decreasing in the level of risk. The purpose of this section is to define strategic risk-aversion and then describe its main consequences for distributional comparative statics.
Throughout this section the strategy set X is assumed to be a convex subset of the reals equipped with the Borel algebra to form a measurable space. The one-dimensionality of the choice set is relaxed in later sections. The space Z of possible states is allowed to be an arbitrary convex measurable space. 8 A utility function u : X × Z → describes payoff to an action x ∈ X in state z ∈ Z , and a correspondence Γ : Z → 2 X determines the set of feasible actions in state z ∈ Z . The agent is allowed to condition his optimal action on the actual realized state, and so he will in state z ∈ Z simply choose an action which solves:
The random variable z has distribution η ∈ (Z ), where (Z ) denotes the set of probability measures on Z . η need not be a continuous distribution or satisfy any other regularity conditions. In particular η may be degenerate making the deterministic case a special case. Given the distribution 8 A convex space is a convex subset of an ordered topological vector space. The standard example here is a convex subset of n with the usual Euclidean/coordinatewise order and the usual topology. As usual we write x > 0 when x ≥ 0 and x = 0, and x 0 when x lies in the interior of the vector order's positive cone (similarly with t > 0 and t 0).
η, an η-optimal policy is a measurable mapping g :
The expected payoff to an η-optimal strategy is given by:
It is obvious that an η-optimal strategy maximizes this expected payoff among all feasible policies, where a feasible policy is one such that g (z ) ∈ Γ(z ) for η-almost every z ∈ Z . So an alternative way of thinking of the previous framework is from the ex-ante perspective where the agent chooses a feasible policy so as to maximize the expected payoff.
An optimal policy is a measurable mapping such that
Clearly, g is an η-optimal policy for all η ∈ if and only if g is an optimal policy, in particular, the maximal expected payoff will be W g (η) for any η ∈ . Since allowing η to vary is central to the concept of strategic risk-aversion, I am going to focus exclusively on optimal policies from now
on. An optimal strategy is a random variable on X whose distribution is given by η x (A) = η{z ∈ Z :
∈ A} where g is an optimal policy and A is any measurable subset of X . The optimal strategy's expected value, what I call the expected strategy, is: 9
Strategic risk-aversion intuitively means that the agent will become more defensive ex-ante if she is subjected to increased risk:
Definition 1 (Strategic Risk-Aversion and Risk-Love) An agent with optimal policy g : Z → X is
wheneverη is a mean-preserving spread of η.
An agent who is both strategically risk-averse and risk-loving so that g (η) = g (η) wheneverη is a mean-preserving spread of η, is said to be strategically risk-neutral. The following theorem shows some of the reasons why strategic risk-aversion is so significant for distributional comparative statics (many more reasons will follow in subsequent sections). Specifically, it shows how strategic risk-aversion determines the change in the optimal strategy (the ex-post distribution) as well as the welfare effects. For example, in the income-inequality setting of the introduction, theorem 1 tells us that if the population of consumers is strategically risk-averse and the savings function is increasing in income (the latter being a rather innocent condition), then not only will savings-per-capita decrease with increased inequality, the individual saving levels' variance (which is a measure of inequality of outcomes) will increase as well. Furthermore, under standard assumptions on the utility of consumption, utilitarian social welfare will decrease when a population of strategically risk-averse agents experience an increase in inequality. If instead the population is strategically risk-loving, then savings-per-capita as well as social welfare will increase if inequality increases, but the ex-post level of inequality increases just as in the risk-averse case (the stochastic order that intuitively predicts "increased mean and increased variance" is called the
convex-increasing order)
. 10 The proof, along with other non-essential proofs, is placed in section 9:
Theorem 1 (Strategic Risk-Aversion: Welfare and Economic Outcomes) Consider an agent with optimal policy g : Z → X , welfare (4), and optimal strategy η x as defined above. Then: 10 Precisely, the distributionη x is larger than η x with respect to the convex-increasing order if
for any increasing and convex function f . As mentioned, this intuitively means thatη x has a higher mean and is more dispersed (higher variance) than η x .
Remark 1 (Inequality Measures) Note that when η measures the distribution of income or some other agent characteristic, 1. corresponds to a change in the the Lorenz curve (Atkinson (1970)) while 2. corresponds to a change in the generalized Lorenz curve (which is constructed by scaling up the Lorenz curve by the distribution's mean, see e.g. Dorfman (1979) ).
Remark 2
The increasing/decreasing conditions on g of theorem 1 can be established by use of monotone comparative statics (Topkis (1978) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , and Quah (2007)).
Quasi-concave Differences and Strategic Risk-Aversion
The theory of monotone comparative statics provides conditions under which an optimization problem such as (3) admits an optimal policy g that is increasing. As proved in a celebrated paper by Topkis (1978) , a sufficient condition for this is that the objective function exhibits increasing differences (in addition the constraint correspondence Γ must satisfy certain conditions, see 
It is easy to verify that Γ : Z → 2 X is concave if and only if −Γ : Z → 2 −X is convex. Convexity in this sense was defined in Kuroiwa (1996) who also offers an extensive discussion of set-valued convexity.
Concavity or convexity of Γ is not to be confused with either convexity of its values or convexity of its graph. A correspondence Γ : Z → 2 X is convex-valued if Γ(z ) is a convex subset of X for all z ∈ Z , and it has a convex graph if {(x , z ) ∈ X ×Z : x ∈ Γ(z )} is a convex subset of X ×Z . Neither concavity or convexity implies convex values (or vice versa). Meanwhile, convexity of a correspondence's graph is much stronger than convexity and concavity. In fact, one easily verifies that a correspondence with a convex graph is both convex, concave, and has convex values. I shall return to the convex graph assumption when looking at stochastic dynamic programming problems in section 6.
The following observation is useful for verifying that a specific constraint correspondence is concave or convex.
Theorem 2 (Characterizing Concavity/Convexity in Terms of Greatest/Least Selections) If Γ : Z → 2 X admits a greatest selection, γ(z ) ≡ sup Γ(z ) ∈ Γ(z ) for all z ∈ Z , then Γ will be concave if and only if
Γ will be convex if and only if γ is a convex function.
Proof. I prove only the convex case (the same idea applies in the concave case). Assume throughout that Γ admits a least selection. If Γ is convex, we will for any z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z , and λ ∈ [0, 1] have an
In the often encountered case of inequality constraints,
theorem 2 tells us that Γ will be concave [convex] if and only if γ is concave [γ is convex].
Quasi-Concave Differences
Next follows a key definition of this paper:
Definition 3 (Quasi-Concave and Quasi-Convex Differences) A function u :
u is said to exhibit quasi-concave [quasi-convex] differences globally. Obviously u exhibits quasiconcave differences (globally) if and only if −u exhibits quasi-convex differences (globally), so it is sufficient to concentrate our discussion on one of them in what follows.
Quasi-concave differences is a complementarity condition much in the spirit of Topkis' notion of increasing differences. In our vector space setting, the function u exhibits increasing differences
is increasing in z (for all δ > 0, x ∈ X , and z ∈ Z ). 11 In words, this simply means that the larger z is, the larger will be the agent's "marginal payoff" (I use the term marginal payoff even if u is not differentiable in x -the more correct but also more cumbersome terminology would be "the increase in payoff associated with adding an additional unit"). With quasi-concave differences, the complementarity is not between x and z , but between x on the one hand and convex combinations of (x , z ) on the other. To be precise, consider two points (x , z ) and (x , z ) and a convex combination of the two (αx
an additional unit δ > 0 to the decision variable of all three bringing us to (x + δ, z ), (x + δ, z ), and (αx +(1−α)x +δ, αz +(1−α)z ), respectively. Quasi-concave differences then says that the "marginal payoff" must increase when we go from (at least) one of the endpoints to the convex combination.
Indeed, writing the definition of quasi-concave differences out in full that is exactly how it reads:
A more graphical way of looking at the condition is in terms of the upper contours of the marginal payoffs: If we define "indifference" between (x , z ) and (x ,z ) to mean that the marginal payoff is the same, then quasi-concave differences is equivalent to convexity of the upper contour sets of the resulting "indifference diagram". From this observation a variety of text-book economic interpretations of the condition can be conjured up. I shall leave the details to the interested reader, since from a practical/applied perspective there is a much more important question to address, namely how to establish quasi-concave differences when faced with a concrete functional form. Since quasiconcavity and quasi-convexity is preserved under pointwise limits (Johansen (1972) ), it is straightforward to see from (7) -by dividing through with δ and taking limits -that if u is differentiable
The converse statement is what we really need, however, and this turns out to be much more difficult to prove since quasi-concavity is not preserved under integration. 12
Theorem 3 (Differentiability Criterion) Assume that u : X × T → is differentiable in x ∈ X ⊆ n . Then u exhibits quasi-concave differences [quasi-convex differences] if and only if each of the
Proof. Section 9.
Remark 3 In section 6, I present an extension of theorem 3 that applies when u is merely assumed to be absolutely continuous in x (see theorem 12). Such an extension is useful for applications to dynamic programming. Also in section 6, I present a result (lemma 2) showing that quasi-concave differences is particularly easy to verify in the special, but for applications very important case where u is additively separable.
Because of theorem 3 one can always calculate D x u (x , z ) and then use the Bordered Hessian
Criterion (Arrow and Enthoven (1961) ) to prove that a sufficiently smooth function exhibits quasiconcave differences. Thus quasi-concave differences is a workable condition on par with concavity (the Hessian criterion) and increasing differences (the non-negative cross-partial derivatives criterion of Topkis (1978)).
The One-Dimensional Case
I begin with the simplest case where the choice variable is one-dimensional (X ⊆ ) since this case is much easier to prove and requires no additional definitions. Note that in this case it is highly intuitive that quasi-concave differences should lead to a concave policy function and so to strategicrisk aversion. A function g : Z → X is concave if when we look at any two points z and z in the domain, the value at the convex combination satisfies g (λz
. We saw in (7) that under quasi-concave differences, the marginal payoff at the convex combination must be higher than at the end-points. With an optimizing agent, we would therefore expect that the previous inequality ends up holding.
The proof of theorem 4 is essentially a formalization of the previous argument, the only remaining complication relates to situations where optimal actions lie on the boundary of the constraint set Γ(z ). If the optimal policy g is to be concave (strategic risk-aversion), it poses no problems if the upper boundary of Γ(z ) is optimal for some or all z ∈ Z . Intuitively, this is because the lower envelope of two concave functions is concave. 13 And by theorem 2, the upper boundary of the constraint correspondence sup Γ(z ) will be a concave function when Γ is a concave correspondence. Hitting the lower boundary will, in sharp contrast, utterly destroy any hope of getting a concave optimal policy for reasons that are best explained through a figure.
Figure 1: Concavity is destroyed when the optimal policy g touches the lower boundary of Γ(z ) (in the graph inf Γ(z ) = 0 for all z ).
In this figure, we see a concave optimal policy which decreases and at a point touches the lower boundary 0 = inf Γ(z ) of the constraint correspondence and stays there as z is further increased (for example we could have Γ(z ) = [0,z ] for all z wherez > 0). It is evident that the resulting optimal policy will not be concave, even if it is concave on the interval before the lower boundary is reached.
As I discuss at length in section 8.1, this observation is quite general -strategic risk-aversion and lower boundary optimizers cannot coexist save for some very pathological cases. Of course, there is no problem if the optimization problem is unconstrained for all z , i.e., if inf Γ(z ) = −∞ for all z . Nor is there a problem if attention is restricted to values of z for which optimizers are interior (witness figure 1 where we do have concavity on the initial interval and so the following theorem would apply there).
Theorem 4 (Quasi-Concave Differences and Strategic Risk-Aversion) Let Z be an arbitrary convex set and X ⊆ a convex subset of the reals. Assume that u : X × Z → is strictly quasi-concave in x , that Γ has convex values, and that
1. The agent will be strategically risk-averse if u : X × Z → exhibits quasi-concave differences, Γ : Z → 2 X is concave, and lower boundary points are not optimal (g (z ) = inf Γ(z ) for all z ∈ Z ).
2. The agent will be strategically risk-loving if u : X × Z → exhibits quasi-convex differences, Γ : Z → 2 X is convex, and upper boundary points are not optimal (g (z ) = sup Γ(z ) for all z ∈ Z ).
Remark 4 (Weaker Boundary Conditions)
The boundary conditions of theorem 4 are in fact stronger than necessary. Intuitively, lower boundary optimizers are allowed (in the strategic risk-aversion case) if it would not raise the payoff to lower the action any further at that point. Similarly for upper boundary points in the risk-loving case. Specifically, the proof to follow uses the following conditions which clearly are weaker than ruling out lower/upper boundary conditions altogether: 1.
There does not exist any z ∈ Z such that g (z ) = inf Γ(z ) while at the same time u (·, z ) is strictly decreasing at g (z ). 2. There does not exist any z ∈ Z such that g (z ) = sup Γ(z ) while at the same
tuitively, g may touch the lower (respectively, upper) boundary as long as the first-order condition holds.
Proof of Theorem 4. Throughout I use the notation z α = αz 1 + (1 − α)z 2 and x α = αx 1 + (1 − α)x 2 , where z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X . I first prove the risk-loving case 2.. For a given state z ∈ Z , let G (z ) ⊆ X denote the set of optimizers (under strict quasi-concavity, G (z ) will of course be a singleton, but the added generality actually simplifies the proof). Pick z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z and x 1 ∈ G (z 1 ),
14 Unless there exists an x ∈ G (z α ) with x > x α we are done. So consider such an x . Since Γ is convex, there exists at least one elementx ∈ Γ(z α ) withx ≤ x α , and since Γ has convex values therefore
, and x is optimal, it follows that x α ∈ G (z α ). We conclude that for all α ∈ [0, 1] there existsx ∈ G (z α ) withx ≤ x α , i.e., G is a convex correspondence. When G = {g }, i.e., when the optimizer is always unique as will be the case under the assumed strict quasi-concavity, convexity of G is equivalent to convexity of g which in turn is equivalent to strategic risk-aversion.
To prove the first (concave) case, replace the choice variable x with −x and repeat the previous argument considering now the transformed problemg (z ) = arg sup x ∈−Γ(z ) u (−x , z ). It is clear that the conditions of 1. will then replace the conditions of 2. (in particular, the lower boundary becomes the upper boundary and Γ must be concave). The "true" optimal policy g will of course equal −g (z )
and so g is convex if and only ifg is concave. Since convexity of g is equivalent to strategic risk-love, this finishes the proof.
Remark 5 (The Set-Valued Case) If u : X ×Z → is assumed to be quasi-concave instead of strictly quasi-concave, the set of optimizers G (z ) = sup x ∈Γ(z ) u (x , z ) will in general not be a singleton. The proof of theorem 4 shows that in this case G : Z → 2 X will, in the risk-averse case, still be concave in the sense of definition 2 (and in the risk-loving case, G will be convex). If G (z ) is compact for all z (e.g., this will be the case if Γ is compact valued and u (·, z ) is upper semi-continuous), this implies the existence of a concave selection in the risk-averse case and a convex selection in the risk-loving case (theorem 2). If, in the set-valued case we say that an agent is risk-averse [risk-loving] if there exists some optimal policy (a selection from G , see the beginning of section 3.3) that is concave
[convex], the conclusion of theorem 4 therefore remains valid without strict quasi-concavity as long as G has compact values.
Remark 6 (Dispensing with Quasi-concavity) If u : X ×Z → is assumed to exhibit quasi-concave [quasi-convex] differences globally, then the set-valued version of theorem 4 described in the previous remark holds without any quasi-concavity assumptions on u (·, z ) (see theorem 13). If it is assumed that u exhibits strictly quasi-concave differences globally, sup x ∈Γ(z ) u (x , z ) will be a singleton for all z ∈ Z , and so in this case the statement of theorem 4 holds without modifications.
The General Case
I now turn to the general case where the decision vector is allowed to live in an arbitrary ordered topological vector space V , x ∈ X ⊆ V and where the payoff function is not assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. Without strict quasi-concavity, it is necessary to consider the set of optimal choices, denoted by G (z ) ⊆ X and defined as:
G : Z → 2 X is called the (optimal) policy correspondence. An optimal policy is now defined as a selection from G , i.e., a function g : Z → X with g (z ) ∈ G (z ) for all z ∈ Z . In this setting, strategic risk-aversion is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Strategic Risk-Aversion and Risk-Love, General Case) An agent with optimal policy
Note that g (η) will be a vector when X is multi-dimensional. The inequality in definition 4 is therefore coordinatewise. Intuitively, an increase in uncertainty makes a strategically risk-averse agent more "defensive" in all of his decision variables. It is clear that definition 4 generalizes the definition of strategic risk-aversion in section 2 since if G (z ) is single-valued and X is one-dimensional we are back at definition 1.
The multi-dimensional setting forces us to make some additional assumptions. In terms of Theorem 4, X must be a lattice, u must be supermodular in the decision vector, and Γ must be lower semi-lattice valued in the strategic risk-loving case and upper semi-lattice valued in the strategic risk-averse case. 15 Finally, the boundary conditions must be suitably generalized as we turn to first.
It should be noted that all of these assumptions trivially/automatically will be satisfied when X is one-dimensional. Hence the result to follow encompasses theorem 4.
First, the basic definitions. Say that a point x ∈ Γ(z ) lies on the upper (lower) boundary of Γ(z ) if there does not exist an x ∈ Γ(z ) with x x (x x ). The upper boundary is denoted by B(Γ(z )) and the lower boundary is denoted by B(Γ(z )). What we are going to require in the theorem below is as in in Theorem 4 except that the infimum [supremum] is replaced with the lower [upper] boundary.
Next, X must be a lattice, i.e., if x and x lie in X so do their infimum x ∧x and supremum x ∨x . If X ⊆ n with the usual Euclidean/coordinatewise order, the infimum (supremum) is simply the coordinatewise minimum (maximum). Assuming that X is a lattice is actually a very weak additional requirement in the present framework because it is the constraint correspondence Γ that determines the feasible set. It is the next assumption that really has "bite". A lower semi-lattice [upper semi-lattice] is a subset A ⊂ X with the property that if x , x ∈ A then the infimum x ∧ x [supremum
Either is of course weaker than being a lattice. For example, a budget set is a lower semi-lattice (but not a lattice), and a firm's input requirement set is an upper semi-lattice (but not a lattice). As was mentioned above, we are going to assume that Γ's values are lower (upper) semi-lattices in the risk-loving (risk-averse) case. As the mentioned examples of budget and input requirement sets should indicate, the fact that we avoid assuming that Γ's values are lattices greatly expands the scope of the result's applicability.
Finally, u must be supermodular in the choice variables. The well-known definition is as follows.
Definition 5 (Topkis (1978))
The objective function u :
and for all z ∈ Z . If u is twice differentiable in x and X ⊆ n , it is supermodular in x if and only if the Hessian matrix D
2 x x u (x , z ) ∈ n×n
has non-negative off-diagonal elements (for all x and z ).
I am now able to state and prove the following generalized version of theorem 4. Note that just as in theorem 4, the boundary conditions will be trivially satisfied if the optimization problem is unrestricted. And just as in theorem 4, we could instead of the following formulation have assumed that lower/upper boundary points are never optimal.
Theorem 5 (Strategic Risk-Aversion and Risk-Love in the Multidimensional Case) Let Z be an arbitrary convex set and X a convex lattice. Define the policy correspondence
where u : X × Z → is quasi-concave and supermodular in x and Γ : Z → 2 X has convex values. Assume that G (z ) is non-empty and compact for all z ∈ Z . Then:
1. The agent will be strategically risk-averse if u exhibits quasi-concave differences in (x , z ), Γ is concave and upper semi-lattice valued, and there does not exist any z ∈ Z with x ∈ G (Z ) ∩
2. The agent will be strategically risk-loving if u exhibits quasi-convex differences in (x , z ), Γ is convex and lower semi-lattice valued, and there does not exist any
The proof of theorem 5 follows in a moment. The idea is to show that G will be concave in the risk-averse case and convex in the risk-loving case. If G is concave and has a greatest selection, this greatest selection will be concave by theorem 2 and so the agent will be strategically risk-averse in the sense of definition 4. Likewise, G will have a convex selection if it is convex and has a least selection and then the agent will be strategically risk-loving. The assumed compactness of G (z ) precisely ensures these outcomes when G is concave (respectively, convex): 
quasi-concave and has a maximum at x , it will be non-decreasing on the line segment between x ∧x and x (this is because x = x ∧x +αδ where α ≥ 0 and δ > 0). In particular u (x , z )−u (x ∧x , z ) ≥ 0. It follows that u (x ∨ x , z ) = u (x , z ) and so when Γ(z ) is an upper semi-lattice, x ∨ x ∈ G (z ). The same method of proof applied in the case of lower semi-lattices.
Proof of Theorem 5. As explained above, the statements follow from concavity of G in the riskaverse case and convexity of G in the risk-loving case. I consider here the risk-loving case only (the concave case is proved by the exact same duality argument as that given at the end of the proof of theorem 4). Pick z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z , x 1 ∈ G (z 1 ), and x 2 ∈ G (z 2 ). Exactly as in the proof of theorem 4, we can use quasi-convex differences to conclude that for some δ 0,
Hence by quasi-concavity of u in x , u (x , z α ) is non-increasing for x ≥ x α . We wish to show that for all α there existsx ∈ G (z α ) withx ≤ x α . Pick any x ∈ G (z α ). I am first going to prove that,
Since Γ is a convex correspondence, there exists somex ∈ Γ(z α ) withx ≤ x α . We have x ∈ Γ(z α )
(since x ∈ G (z α )) and so since Γ's values are lower semi-lattices,
That was what we wanted to show. Next use supermodularity of u (·, t ) and the fact that u (·, z α ) is non-increasing for x ≥ x α (implies that
(9)-(10) imply that x ∧ x α ∈ G (z α ). But since clearly x ∧ x α ≤ x α this completes the proof.
Risk Comparative Statics in Bayesian Games
In this section, I further develop the concept of strategic risk-aversion by integrating it into a game with incomplete information. The main purpose is to investigate how increased risk (decreased precision of private signals) affects the set of (Bayesian) equilibria in such games. Answering this distributional comparative statics question is important because it helps us understand whether strategically interacting agents will become more or less bold/aggressive/efficient, etc. when faced with increased uncertainty. For example, in a Diamond type search model, costs and effectiveness of searching could be random and the question then is whether greater uncertainty increases or decreases mean search efforts. In the arms race game studied in detail below, the efficiency of arms could be random and the question is whether this leads to larger or smaller arsenals in equilibrium, and also what happens to the variability. Three results are presented. The first addresses the (partial equilibrium) stage where individuals are subjected to greater uncertainty while opponents' strategies remain fixed (theorem 6). An informal summary of that result is that increased risk will transmit to higher variance of the strategy but the mean may increase or decrease, depending on whether the payoff function exhibits quasi-convex or quasi-concave differences. The next result (theorem 7)
generalizes a result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) , and deals with the stage where increased uncertainty is transmitted between agents. Finally, theorem 8 -which is the main result -combines the two with an equilibrium comparative statics argument to predict the effect of increased uncertainty on the set of Bayesian equilibria.
As mentioned, the discussion focuses on incomplete information games -so agents face uncertainty about their environment, and must choose strategies without knowing with certainty what opponents will do (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , chapter 3). But as will be seen, theorems 6-7 readily transfer to other settings, and the basic techniques employed in the proof of theorem 8 are of general applicability for distributional comparative statics (for example see Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) ).
Consider the standard Bayesian set-up where each player i in a finite set of players = {1, . . . , I } receives a private signal z i ∈ Z i ⊆ drawn from a distribution µ z i on a measurable space (Z i , (Z i )) (here and below (·) denotes the Borel algebra of a given set). I am going to simplify the treatment by assuming that the private signals are independently distributed. So an optimal strategy is a measurable mapping x i : Z i → X i (here X i ⊆ n is agent i 's strategy set) such that for almost every
A Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy profile x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * I ) such that for each player i , x * i : Z i → X i is an optimal strategy given the opponents' strategies x * −i : Z −i → X −i . In this paper's terminology, x i : Z i → X i is a optimal policy when it satisfies (11) for all z i ∈ Z i .
And the optimal strategy is the random variable on (X i , (X i )) whose distribution is given by:
We begin by assuming continuity and that players are risk averse so that the optimal policy and its distribution (12) are uniquely determined:
Assumption 1 For every i : X i is compact and u
I am now ready to exploit this paper's main results to address the first interesting comparative statics question: Imagine that a player i faces increased "background risk" in the sense that µ z i is subjected to a mean-preserving spread. How is the distribution of the player's optimal strategy µ x i as defined in (12) going to change in response? The answer given next applies to the general case with multidimensional strategy sets and is a direct application of theorems 1 and 5. The special case where the strategy set is one-dimensional is addressed in parenthesis, and a remark after the theorem considers the simpler differentiable case. As was mentioned above, the conclusion is that increased risk will transmit to higher variance of the strategy but the mean may increase or decrease, depending on whether the payoff function exhibits quasi-convex or quasi-concave differences. To appreciate this, recall from section 2 that the second order stochastic dominance order (also known as the concave-increasing order and henceforth denoted by c v i ) intuitively corresponds to "higher mean and lower variance", so a second order stochastic dominance decrease intuitively corresponds to "lower mean and higher variance". An increase in the closely related convex-increasing order denoted by c x i instead intuitively corresponds to "higher mean and higher variance".
Theorem 6
Consider a player i ∈ , let assumption 1 be satisfied, and assume that u i is supermodular in x i on a latticeX i with X i ⊆X i (this is automatically satisfied if X i ⊆ ).
If z
an upper semi-lattice, and no element on the lower boundary of X i (inf X i if X i ⊆ ) is optimal, then a mean-preserving spread to µ z i will lead to a second order stochastic dominance decrease in the distribution of the optimal strategy µ x i .
lower semi-lattice, and no element on the upper boundary of
then a mean-preserving spread to µ z i will lead to a convex-increasing stochastic dominance increase in the distribution of the optimal strategy µ x i .
Remark 7 If
Proof. By theorem 5, the agent will be strategically risk-averse in case 1. and strategically risk-loving in case 2.. The conclusions now follow from theorem 1 (which immediately generalizes to the multidimensional setting).
The previous comparative statics result applies to standard decision problems and so in the Bayesian context is a partial equilibrium result. If a subset of players (or all of them) are subjected to increased background risk, theorem 6 tells us how the affected players will change their strategies when opponents' strategies are held fixed. In a game, the story clearly does not end there, though: Increased risk will in turn transmit to the opponents and make everybody's game environments more risky (this is the endogenous risk components of a Bayesian game). The equilibrium outcome is dealt with in theorem 8 below, but before we can get to that, we need a result that addresses the mentioned "transmission stage". The result does not rest on any of this papers' main results. It is a straight-forward generalization of a result found in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) who consider mean-preserving spreads in the one-dimensional differentiable case. 17 Note from a technical point 16 More generally, a sufficient condition is that u i exhibits concave or convex differences in x i and z i (defined precisely as quasi-concave/quasi-convex differences except that the difference in the definition must be concave/convex rather than merely quasi-concave/quasi-convex). Note that it is not sufficient to assume that u i exhibits quasi-convex/quasiconcave differences in x i and z i because quasi-convexity and quasi-concavity are not preserved by integration. 17 If u is differentiable in x , the main condition of theorem 7 is equivalent to the concavity of D x u (x , ·) which exactly is the assumption of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) . of view, that in the "transmission stage" addressed by the result, agents change their optimal policies (policy functions). This is in sharp contrast to the background risk stage which strategic riskaversion addresses since there the optimal policy remains fixed.
Theorem 7
Consider the problem of maximizing U (x ) = Ω u (x , ω)µ(d ω) on a compact lattice X ⊆ n where u (·, ω) is strictly concave and supermodular. Taking µ to be the independent variable, so that the policy function is of the form x = g (µ), and writingμ c x µ whenμ is a mean-preserving spread of µ, we then have:
the optimal strategy is decreasing [increasing] in the level of risk.
•
Proof. The proof of the first statement is a direct application of Topkis' theorem (Topkis (1998)),
increasing differences in x (with the usual order) and µ (with the convex/mean-preserving spread order). Also by Topkis' theorem we get that if
(here s t denotes the first-order stochastic dominance order). From this and the first statement follows the second statement because it is always possible to split a second order stochastic dominance increase into a mean preserving contraction followed by a first order stochastic dominance increase (formally, ifμ c v i µ, then there exists a distributionμ such that µ s tμ c v µ).
Finally, I can now answer the question we set out to answer: What is the effect of increased risk (decreased precision of private signals) on Bayesian equilibria. Before I can state the result, it is necessary to explain what it means that a correspondence is increasing (this is the statement made about the correspondence that maps the distributions µ z i into the set of equilibrium strategies in the theorem to follow). 18 Let Φ : A → 2 B be a correspondence where A and B are ordered sets. Then Φ is increasing if (i) for all a 2 ≥ a 1 , and b 1 ∈ Φ(a 1 ), there exists a b 2 ∈ Φ(a 2 ) with b 2 ≥ b 1 , and (ii) for all a 2 ≥ a 1 , and b 2 ∈ Φ(a 2 ), there exists a b 1 ∈ Φ(a 1 ) with b 1 ≤ b 2 . It is clear that if Φ is single-valued, corresponding in the following theorem to the situation where the equilibrium is always unique, increasing just has the usual meaning for a function.
Theorem 8 (Mean Preserving Spreads in Bayesian Games)
Consider a Bayesian game as described above. Then:
18 Since an equilibrium strategy (x * 1 , . . . , x * I ) is a vector of random variables, and the set of probability distributions with the order of second stochastic dominance is generally not a lattice (Müller and Scarsini (2006) ), we cannot use the commonly used strong set order (Topkis (1998) ). The order used here is a combination of type I and type II monotonicity in the sense of Smithson (1971) , see also Acemoglu and Jensen (2012). 1. If all assumptions of theorem 6.1 are satisfied and u i (
and concave in x −i for allx i ≥ x i , then a mean-preserving spread to the distributions µ z i of any subset of the players will lead to a second order stochastic dominance decrease in the set of equilibrium strategies (in particular the agents' mean strategies will decrease, and the strategies' variance will increase).
2. If all assumptions of theorem 6.2 are satisfied and
and convex in x −i for allx i ≥ x i , a mean-preserving spread to the distributions µ z i of any subset of the players will lead to a convex-increasing order increase in the set of equilibrium strategies (in particular the agents' mean strategies will increase, and again the strategies' variance will increase).
The proof will be presented after a remark and a corollary. The following corollary follows by essentially the same argument as that used to prove Theorem 8:
Corollary 1 (Second Order Stochastic Dominance Changes) If in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 8, it is assumed that
is increasing in z i , then if the µ z i 's of one or more players are subjected to a second order stochastic dominance decrease (special cases of which are a mean preserving spread and a first-order stochastic dominance decrease, respectively), the equilibrium strategies will all decrease in the second order stochastic dominance order in case 1. In case 2., all strategies will increase in the convex-increasing order when the µ z i 's are subjected to convex-increasing order increases.
Proof. (of Theorem 8).
It is convenient to recast the game purely in the form of optimal strategies' measures. The problem facing agent i is to find a measurable function x i which for a.e. z i ∈ Z i solves:
The policy function is of the form
Let (X i ) and (Z i ) denote the space of finite probability measures on (X i , (X i )) and
respectively (by default sets of probability measures are equipped with the weak * -topology, though this plays only a minor technical role here). It is convenient to make optimal strategies' dependence on opponents' strategies and the distributions of private signals explicit and write
1. Place the concave order c v on (Z i ) and the concave-increasing order c v i on (X i ). Note that a mean preserving spread is equivalent to a decrease in the order c v .
(this is theorem 7). Since the first order stochastic dominance order is stronger than the concaveincreasing order, this implies that
. Thus the game (as represented by image measures) is monotone in the concave-increasing order, by which we mean that an equilibrium is a fixed point:
of a system of mappings µ x i : ( (X j )) j =i × {µ z i } → (X i ) all of which are monotone in the order c v i (note that in this statement µ z i , i = 1, . . . , I are kept fixed). By theorem 6, 2. In the second case we proceed exactly as above except that we now place the convex order c x on (Z i ) and the increasing-convex order c x i on (X i ). The conclusion then becomes that the mean-preserving spreads to µ z i will lead convex-increasing order increases in the optimal strategies' distributions.
An Example: The Arms Race
There are many interesting applications of this section's results ranging from auction theory to the Diamond search model. Here I am going to look at the classical arms race game (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ) from the field of conflict resolution, and ask whether increased uncertainty about arms' effectiveness and opponents' intentions leads to an intensification of the arms race or not.
There are two countries, i = 1, 2, with identical state payoff functions u i (
B is a strictly concave function and c > 0 a constant cost parameter. z i is a random variable that reflects the relative effectiveness of the arms -real or imagined (for example a domestic media frenzy might correspond to z i > 0). 19 Assuming that B is sufficiently smooth, we can use the conditions in remark 8 when applying theorem 8. By strict concavity,
is increasing in x −i , and the question is therefore whether it is also either convex or concave in (x i , z i ) and in x −i . Obviously, this depends entirely on whether B is convex or concave, i.e., on whether the third derivative of B is positive or negative. In the convex case (positive third derivative), the countries are strategically risk-loving and so will become more aggressive if the environ-ment becomes more uncertain. Precisely, greater uncertainty will make the affected country's (or countries') expected stock of arms as well as the variance hereof increase (theorem 6, which specifically says that given the other country's strategy, greater uncertainty will lead to a convex-increasing shift in the arms strategy). This will transmit to a more uncertain environment for the other country and make it accumulate more arms (theorem 7). This escalation continues until an equilibrium is reached with higher mean stocks of arms and greater uncertainty about the exact size of the arsenals. 20 Note that a positive third derivative means that the countries are "prudent" (Kimball (1990) ) -a well-understood behavioral trait that also plays a key role in other settings such as in incomeallocation problems (Carroll and Kimball (1996) ). Of course, prudence, which in the words of Kimball (1990) (p.54) is "the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty", has rather more beneficial consequences in income-allocation models than it does in arms races. It is therefore not uniformly good news that experimental evidence seems to suggest that most people are prudent (Nussair et al (2011)). But of course, prudence may be situation dependent or politicians may be elected that are not prudent. In this case B will have a negative third derivative, and the countries will be strategically risk-averse so that greater uncertainty lowers the mean stock of arms in equilibrium. Note however, that according to theorem 8, the variance will still increase, so whether decision makers are prudent or not, the risk of exceptionally high stocks of arms and the utter destruction of the countries in case of war still increases when the environment becomes more uncertain.
The Comparative Statics of Dominating Lorenz Curves
Recall from the introduction, the expression for average savings in an economy populated by a group of agents that receive different incomes but otherwise are identical:
Here g is the savings function which gives savings g (m , r ) as a function of income m and the rate of interest r . In a two-period income allocation model with consumption x 1 when "young" and x 2 when "old", savings of course equals g (m , r ) = m − x 1 (m , r ) where x 1 (m , r ) is the young consumer's demand function. In this section I return to this example and give an exhaustive answer to the question of when the savings/consumption function is convex or concave. A concave savings function (convex consumption function when young) is equivalent to strategic risk-aversion and strategic risk-aversion is in turn necessary and sufficient for aggregate savings to be decreasing in inequality.
The consequences of strategic risk-aversion for the (ex-post) distribution of savings as well as social welfare were described immediately prior to theorem 1. Thus by answering the convexity/concavity question, we end up answering a number of fundamental distributional comparative statics questions and in doing so gain an understanding of how inequality relates to aggregate savings, ex-post inequality, and consumers' welfare. As for the intuition, a strategically risk-averse agent becomes more "defensive" -here, lowers her average savings -in the face of increased uncertainty. And since a group of identical agents with different income levels formally is equivalent to a single (representative) agent who has uncertain income, this intuition carries over from the individual to the aggregate level. 21 It should be noted that the techniques, and even the exact results in many instances, apply to any situation where some aggregate quantity under investigation (labor supply/demand, investments, etc.) depends on the individual actions of a population that is identical except for one wellspecified agent characteristic (income, preference parameters, technological parameters, etc.). So the results to follow actually represents a general approach to distributional comparative statics in populations of agents.
In place of the utility specification of the introduction, I am going to consider the slightly more general semi-stationary additively separable utility maximization problem: 22 Before applying this paper's results, consider the following result due to Pollak (1971) who derived explicit conditions on direct utility for the indirect utility conditions of Gorman (1953) to be satisfied in the additively separable case:
Theorem 9 (Pollak (1971)) Consider the problem (14) and assume that u : X → is thrice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave and X ⊆ . Then demand will be linear in income for any given vector of prices (p 1 , p 2 ) 0 if and only if,
is constant for all x ∈ X (i.e., β (u , x ) = c , for some c ∈ ).
The condition of the Pollak-result says that u must be a member of the HARA class of Carroll 21 And increased uncertainty in the sense of a mean-preserving spread is formally equivalent to a Lorenz-type increase in inequality in the population. 22 The reader may be wondering why I focus on the quasi-stationary case rather than the general additive case where utility is given by u 1 (x 1 ) + u 2 (x 2 ). The answer is that doing so allows me to compare with the case of linear Engel curves where Pollak (1971) showed that for this more general additive problem to admit linear Engel curves it must be the case that u 1 (x 1 ) = u (a 1 + b 1 x 1 ) and u 2 (x 2 ) = δu (a 2 + b 2 x 2 ) which of course leads to (14) . A second reason for focusing on the quasi-stationary case is of course its more clear relevance for applied work.
and Kimball (1996) . 23 Conveniently, this allows me to refer to Carroll and Kimball (1996) and the references therein for an exhaustive discussion of β (u , x ) -a coefficient that features prominently below. In one interpretation, β (u , x ) is "prudence" divided by "risk-aversion". A more abstract way to look at β (u , x ) is as a "curvature measure": An increase in utility that leads to a one per cent decrease in marginal utility will lead to a β (u , x ) per cent increase in the second derivative.
I now turn to this section's main result. Assuming that u is strictly increasing, we can substitute in (14) and express the problem entirely in terms of demand when young/demand for the first good:
Establishing strategic risk-aversion of savings (convexity of x 1 (m , r ) in m ) is now a direct application of theorem 4, and likewise with strategic risk-love (concavity of x 1 (·, r )). Note that by theorem 2, Γ is convex as well as concave, and it clearly also has convex values (in fact, Γ has a convex graph which implies all three, see the discussion immediately after definition 2). The only remaining difficulty is therefore to establish quasi-concave/quasi-convex differences of the objective function and this is basically all that happens in the proof.
first order-condition, the following condition is found to be necessary and sufficient for u to exhibit strictly quasi-concave differences at an optimum:
At any optimum:
(since u is strictly concave), and so (17) holds when β (u , ·) is strictly decreasing. The conclusion is now a direct application of theorem 4 (here applied locally at the unique optimizer given m ). When
x 1 , so in this case the inequality in (17) requires that β (u , ·) is strictly increasing (see remark 9).
For the only if direction, note that if β (u , ·) is not strictly decreasing at some point, we can pick prices and income so that consumption when young and old are in the neighborhood of this point and run through the previous argument. This yields (17) with the inequality reversed and replaced with a weak inequality, hence D x 1 v (x 1 , m ) will exhibit quasi-convex differences locally at the point considered implying that x 1 (·) will be locally convex.
An Example: Income Inequality in the Overlapping Generations Model
It is straight-forward to integrate theorem 10 into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous consumers. Let me illustrate this in a Diamond-type OLG economy where consumers' labor productivities are allowed to differ as described by a distribution η. Letting l i > 0 denote consumer i 's productivity, his income will then be w l i where w > 0 is the wage rate. The production side is given by an aggregate constant returns to scale technology, F (K , L) where K is capital and L is labor (we would normally have
where k is the capital-labor ratio. Profit maximization then entails:
nally, the capital market clears if k t +1 = S η t (r t , w t )−ρk t where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the factor of depreciation and,
is mean savings (savings by the "representative agent"). Combining all of this we get at each date a single equilibrium condition in the capital-labor ratio:
For a given stationary distribution of the labor endowments η = η t at all t , k ≥ 0 is a steady state if and only if:
Notice that this equation departs from the standard representative agents framework in only one respect: savings of the "representative agent" depends on the distribution of income. So standard methods of analysis now apply. Theorem 10 tells us whether
decrease when inequality increases (in the Lorenz sense). And theorem 1 in addition tells us how a change in inequality will affect the distribution of savings as well as utilitarian social welfare. An interesting finding in this regard is that the outcome of an increase in inequality will depend on the relationship between the interest and discount rate in the steady state (specifically, whether in equilibrium we are in case 1. or case 2. of theorem 10).
Stochastic Dynamic Programming: Convexity and Concavity of the Policy Function
In section 5, concavity/convexity of demand functions was investigated in a two-period scenario.
The purpose of this section is to investigate a similar question in an infinite horizon stochastic setting. The answer is important for a variety of distributional comparative questions. Thus the relationship between earning risk and wealth accumulation is guided by whether the consumption function is concave or convex (Huggett (2004) ). And more generally it determines, in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, the effect of increased individual uncertainty on aggregate market outcomes (Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) ).
Let me begin by placing this section's contribution in the context of existing literature. The standard infinite horizon perfect certainty models with HARA period-utility functions (see section 5) normally used in macroeconomics imply that consumption is linear in income. Hence they do not support the Keynesian conjecture that the consumption function is concave. Surprisingly, adding uncertainty changes the outcome: In a standard stochastic income-allocation setting, Carroll and Kimball (1996) prove that for any HARA utility objective, the consumption function will be concave if there are no borrowing constraints and if the period utility function has a positive third derivative (the precautionary savings motive). Unfortunately, their method of proof relies heavily on the value function being thrice differentiable, a condition that is violated in some important applications such as when borrowing/liquidity constraints are introduced (e.g. Aiyagari (1994) ). Due to the importance of liquidity constraint for much applied work, the same authors (Carroll and Kimball (2001) ) as well as Huggett (2004) address the concavity question in a framework with borrowing constraints. But they meet only with partial success in that they are only able to establish concavity of the consumption function for a few special cases of the general HARA class (CRRA, CARA, and quadratic utility, respectively). By using this paper's results, it is possible to give a much simpler and more direct proof of the concavity of the consumption function using, technically, only that the value function is concave. This allows for much more general results, in particular, the case with borrowing constraints is easily covered showing that the consumption function will be concave for the general HARA class (section 6.1). In fact, by using this method of proof I am able to go much further than the income-consumption allocation problem and cover any dynamic stochastic programming problem at the level of generality of the text-book treatment of Stokey and Lucas (1989) .
Specifically, this looks as follows:
For a detailed treatment of such problems, the reader is referred to Chapter 9 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) . In comparison with the general treatment in Stokey and Lucas (1989) , I make two structural restrictions to simplify the exposition (but the results easily generalize, see remarks 10-11): First, the z t 's are assumed to be i.i.d. with distribution µ z . Second, I consider only the one-dimensional case:
x t ∈ X ⊆ and z t ∈ Z ⊆ . Aside from these restrictions, the treatment below is completely parallel to Stokey and Lucas (1989) . Both X and Z are assumed to be convex sets equipped with their Borel σ-algebras. 24 The value function v : X ×Z → associated with the above problem is determined by the functional equation:
The policy function g : X ×Z → X (assuming of course that such a policy function exists, in particular that optimizers are unique) is given by:
The following two assumptions are completely standard in the literature (see Stokey and Lucas (1989) , Chapter 9). -empty, compact-valued, continuous , and has a convex graph, i.e., for all x ,x ∈ X , z ∈ Z , and all λ ∈ [0, 1]:
Assumption 3 u : X × X × Z → is bounded and continuous, and
is concave in (x , y ) and strictly concave in y .
Under assumptions 2-3, the value function v = v (x , z ) is uniquely determined, continuous, and concave in x . Since u is strictly concave in y , it therefore follows that the objective function on the right-hand side of (23) is continuous and strictly concave in y . Hence g is a well-defined continuous function. The convex graph assumption was discussed in section 3, in particular it was mentioned that it implies that Γ is convex, concave, and has convex values. The assumption is essential for v to be concave, which as I mentioned previously, is critical for the following method of proof.
Theorem 11 (Convex Policy Functions in Dynamic Stochastic Programming Problems)
Consider the stochastic dynamic programming problem (21) under assumptions 2-3 and let g : X × Z → 24 For our result on the policy function g (x , z )'s convexity in x , it may alternatively be assumed that Z is a countable set equipped with the σ-algebra consisting of all subsets of Z (see Stokey and Lucas (1989) , Assumption 9.5.a.).
X denote the policy function defined in (23). Assume that u (x , y , z ) is differentiable and satisfies the following upper boundary condition: lim y n ↑sup Γ(x ,z ) D y u (x , y n , z ) = −∞ (or in some other way ensure that sup Γ(x , z ) will never be optimal given (x , z )). Then the policy function g will be convex in x if D x u (x , y , z ) is non-decreasing in y and there exists a k ≥ 0 such that in (x , y ) . 25 If in addition Γ(x , ·) is a convex correspondence and in (y , z ) , the policy function g will also be convex in z .
The proof follows after two remarks.
Remark 10 (General Markov Processes)
The proof of the convexity of the policy function in x goes through without any modifications if z t is allowed to be a general Markov process, i.e., if the functional equation (22) is replaced with:
where Q is z t 's transition function. The straight-forward verification of this claim is left to the reader.
Remark 11 (Multi-dimensional Strategy Sets)
The proof below also easily extends to the case where X and Z are multidimensional. In fact, the only modification needed is in the proof of lemma 3
where now theorem 5 must be used to conclude that g n will be convex in place of theorem 4. Thus theorem 11 extends to the multidimensional case if we in addition assume that u is supermodular in y , that Γ's values are lower semi-lattices, and that optimizers stay away from the upper boundary. 26 I now turn to the proof of theorem 11. We shall be needing two technical result, beginning with the following generalization of theorem 3, which addresses the situation where u is absolutely continuous in x , but not necessarily differentiable (in particular, it covers the case where u is concave in x since any concave function is absolutely continuous).
Theorem 12 (Quasi-Concave and Quasi-Convex Differences in the Absolutely Continuous Case)
Proof. The statement may be verified by going through the proof of theorem 3 replacing u 's derivative with p everywhere.Note that the "if" part of theorem 3 does not hold for absolutely continuous 25 In the limit case k = 1,
] 1−k is by convention equal to log(f (x )). 26 In particular, the objective function in (26) will be supermodular in y when u is supermodular in y because supermodularity/increasing differences is preserved under integration (Topkis (1998) , Theorem 2.7.6.) and v n (y , z ) therefore will be supermodular in y for all n . functions since one can always find a function p (x , z ) that equals D x u (x , z ) almost everywhere but is not quasi-convex (even when D x u (x , z ) exists everywhere and is quasi-convex). In fact, even quasi-convexity in, say, x is easily violated by such a function p by letting p equal D x u everywhere except for at a single point x where p is made to jump up or down suitably (recall that a quasiconvex function is first non-increasing and then non-decreasing, so any jump down on an increasing segment and any jump up at a decreasing segment will destroy quasi-convexity).
The next result is used below to establish quasi-convex/quasi-concave differences of additively separable functions:
Proof. Omitted (see Jensen (2012) , Lemma 3).
The value and policy functions will equal the pointwise limits of the sequences (v n )
Under the theorem's conditions, v n will be concave in x for all n. Since a concave function is absolutely continuous, v n will consequently be absolutely continuous in x for all n . We are going to use this repeatedly and without further mentioning in what follows.
I am now able to prove the main statement of theorem 11. The argument is a standard iteration on the value and policy function. For this iteration, two lemmas are needed. From now on, I am going to simplify the notation by calling a function f :
where as previously mentioned the case k = 1 means log-convex [log-concave] by convention. Quite a bit can be said about such functions, but since this is mainly a mathematical distraction from the point of view of this paper, further investigation has been relegated to a separate technical note (Jensen (2012) ). Given z , let a denote the least point at which v n (·, z ) is defined.
Lemma 3 Assume that
27 In the limit case k = 1,
Proof. This is a direct application of theorem 4 to the optimization problem in (26). We consider here only convexity of g n in x (the exact same argument implies convexity in z under the lemma's square-bracketed assumption). Except for quasi-convex differences in (x , y ), all assumptions of theorem 4 are clearly satisfied. To see that quasi-convex differences holds, we use theorem 12 and must thus verify that the following expression is quasi-convex in (x , y ) on the relevant set which, allowing for solutions at lower boundary points is
To see that this expression is quasi-convex on A, first use that k -convexity is preserved under integration (Jensen (2012) , Lemma 2) to conclude that when p n (y , z ) is k -convex in y ,
Proof. Since v n +1 is absolutely continuous, we can (abusing notation slightly) write it as:
exists almost everywhere and when it exists
, z ) in x now follows immediately from the fact that k -convexity is preserved under convex, increasing transformations (Jensen (2012) , Lemma 1).
To prove that g is convex, simply iterate using the previous two lemmas: Start with any value lim n →∞ g n (·, z ) will be convex. The same argument applies for convexity in z .
Here at the end, I interject a corollary, even though it is of no relevance for this section's results. The argument is the exact same as that of lemma 4. The result is extremely useful for certain applications (see e.g. Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) ).
Corollary to Lemma 4 Assume that
D x u (x , y , z ) [D z u (x , y , z )] is k -convex in (y , z ) and non-decreasing in y and that g (x , z ) is convex in z . Then v (x , z ) = x a p (τ, z ) d τ where p (x , z ) is k -convex in x [v (x , z ) = z a q (x , τ) d τ where q (x , z ) is k -convex in z (hereã = infZ )].
An Example: Income Allocation Problems with Borrowing Constraints
Let us as an application of this section's results return to the income allocation problem discussed and motivated at the beginning of the section. r > 0 and w > 0 denote, respectively, the factor of interest and wage rate. Let Γ(x , z ) = {y ∈ [−b ,b ] : y ≤ r x + w z }, and consider the following income allocation problem whereũ is strictly concave and strictly increasing:
Note that this formulation explicitly incorporates borrowing limits in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) .
Note also that x t is savings at date t , so the policy function g (x , z ) is the savings function and the consumption function is c (x , z ) = r x + w z − g (x , z ). As seen, c is concave in x ("concavity of the consumption function") if and only if g is convex in x ("convexity of the savings function"). In terms of this section's general notation we have u (x , y , z ) =ũ r x + w z − y . It is easy to verify (and well known) that assumptions 2-3 are satisfied. Under a standard boundary condition onũ , we will never have g (x , z ) = sup Γ(x , z ), i.e., the consumer will not choose zero consumption at any date.
We have D y u (x , y , z ) = −ũ (r x +w z −y ) and D x u (x , y , z ) = rũ (r x +w z −y ). D x u is strictly increasing in y sinceũ is strictly concave (in fact, the two are equivalent). So the consumption function will be concave if 28 Assuming thatũ is thrice differentiable, we can make the relationship with the result of Carroll and Kimball (1996) explicit. Since the Hessian determinants of D x u and D y u equal zero, it is straight-forward to verify that whenũ is thrice differentiable,
Clearly, both inequalities will hold if and only if:
This is precisely the condition thatũ must be of the HARA-form as assumed by Carroll and Kimball (1996) in their proof of concavity of the consumption function. One easily verifies that the condition for convexity in z is also satisfied whenũ is of the HARA-form. Thus we have generalized the result of Carroll and Kimball (1996) to the setting with borrowing constraints.
Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a theory of distributional comparative statics that enables us to predict how the distribution of economic parameters such as income, wealth, or an informative signal, impact individual choices and market outcomes. The key economic insight is that strategic risk-aversion -which intuitively means that an agent becomes more defensive in the face of increased uncertainty -is the critical determinant in distributional comparative statics. Mathematically, strategic risk-aversion is equivalent to concavity of the optimal policy, just as (conventional) risk-aversion is equivalent to concavity of the Bernoulli utility function in the standard set-ting. In the main theoretical contribution of the paper I showed that concavity of the policy function, and therefore strategic risk-aversion, hinges on an easily verifiable condition on the primitives of a model, namely quasi-concave differences. That observation parallels Topkis' theorem (Topkis (1978) ) which ensures that the optimal policy is increasing (strategic complementarity) when the objective function exhibits increasing differences.
Three areas of applications were presented, and an example from each studied. The first showed how distributional comparative statics can be applied in games with uncertainty to answer questions such as how increased risk affects individual, as well as equilibrium outcomes. An arms race with uncertainty was studied and it was found that "prudence" (Kimball (1990) ) determines whether mean stocks of arms increases or decreases when uncertainty goes up -but in all cases, a more uncertain environment also leads to higher equilibrium variance and thus greater uncertainty about the level of destruction in the event of a war. The second area where distributional comparative statics is useful is in studies of changes in the distribution of a well-specified agent characteristic (e.g. income) in a population of agents. The example asked how increased inequality of incomes affect aggregate, as well as market outcomes in an overlapping generations economy, and the answer was shown to hang entirely on whether the HARA coefficient (e.g. Carroll and Kimball (1996) ) is increasing or decreasing. Thirdly, concavity/convexity of policy functions in stochastic dynamic programming problems was studied, and as an application a result due to Carroll and Kimball (1996) was generalized to allow for borrowing constraints. The section's results play a key role for distributional comparative statics in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models -a theme taken up in Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) who study, for example, how increased uncertainty about future earnings prospects affects output per worker in the Aiyagari model (Aiyagari (1994) ).
Here at the end, I wish to mention an aspect of this paper's results that has been completely ignored in an attempt to keep the focus on distributional comparative statics. There are many situations where the curvature of policy functions (optimal policies) is critical for a model's outcome.
Since strategic risk-aversion is equivalent to concavity of the optimal policy, and since simple transformations of the optimization problem allows one to establish a variety of other curvature conditions -such as log-convexity, log-linearity, regularity (Myerson (1981) ), and constant direct or inverse demand curvature (Aquirre et al (2010)) -this affords us a much deeper understanding in numerous economic models. Here are some specific instances where curvature conditions are imposed in economic modelling and critically drive the conclusions: In his well-known study of price-discrimination Varian (1985) on p. 874 directly assumes that the demand is a concave function of price. In fact, the curvature of demand and inverse demand functions is the sine qua non for the direction of welfare and output when third degree price discrimination is allowed as Robinson (1933) conjectured and Aquirre et al (2010) recently substantiated. In the Cournot model, it is often assumed that inverse demand is decreasing and convex (Vives (2000) ) since this implies that the Cournot model will be a game of strategic substitutes (see e.g. Acemoglu and Jensen (2011) ). In their study of price-controls' effect on consumers' surplus, Bulow and Klemperer (2009) find that any regulated price reduction below the laissez-faire price will lower consumers' surplus if demand is log-convex. In Rochet and Tirole (2003) 's study of two-sided markets, the assumption of log-concave demand is what allows the authors to conclude that the price-ratio between the two sides of the market will equal the ratio of the price elasticities. As a final example, a paper by Kennan (Kennan (2001) ) tells us that in a non-cooperative game, the Nash equilibrium will be unique if best-response functions are increasing and concave. Thus in a supermodular game, the Nash equilibrium will be unique if agents in addition to the standard conditions have payoff functions that exhibit quasiconcave differences. In each of these cases, this paper's results will provide a deeper understanding by supplying conditions on the model's fundamentals for the postulated curvature conditionsconditions that notably have an economic interpretation by way of strategic risk-aversion.
Appendix I: Discussion and Extensions of the Main Results
In this technical section, I discuss the main assumptions of section 3 and address the extend to which these assumptions can and cannot be relaxed.
Boundary Conditions
Let us begin with the upper boundary condition of theorem 4 (the same discussion applies to the multidimensional case of theorem 5). The following result shows that unless we are looking at the trivial case where the optimal policy is independent of the state, this condition cannot be dispensed with without destroying all hope of establishing strategic risk-aversion/risk-love. I focus here on the strategically risk-loving case, but by a simple duality argument, the same observation applies to the risk-averse case. To avoid any implicit assumptions, I focus on the case where u is not strictly quasi-concave in x .
Lemma 5 (Upper Boundary Maximizers and Non-Convexity) Let Z be a convex set, X ⊆ and convex, and consider the policy correspondence
Assume that u : X × Z → is continuous in (x , z ) ∈ X × Z , and quasi-concave in x , and let g be any optimal policy selection from G . Then if there exists z ∈ Z with x = sup Γ(z ) ∈ G (z ) such that u (x , z ) is strictly increasing in x in a neighborhood of x , g will either (i) be of the trivial form g (z ) = x for all z , or else (ii) g will not be convex.
Proof. Let g be any selection from G for which there exists z = z in Z with x = g (z ) = x . By u 's continuity, and the assumption that u is increasing in x at (x , z ), there exists a λ < 1 such that
it follows that any maximizer given λz + (1 − λ)z (that is, anyx ∈ G (λz + (1 − λ)z )) must be strictly larger than λx + (1 − λ)x . Hence g is not convex.
The previous result of course only concerns the case where Γ(z ) = [x , x ], i.e., where the constraint set is a fixed interval. But making Γ(z ) vary with z does not improve upon the situation -in particular, assuming that the upper boundary of the graph of Γ is convex solves nothing as some scrutiny will reveal (intuitively, even if the upper boundary of the graph of Γ is convex, it has to "fit together" with the convex optimal policy g . Trying to ensure this when g is endogenously determined is a pointless endeavor). In conclusion: If we are to have any hope of establishing strategic risk-love, upper boundary points cannot be permitted as maximizers unless the objective function is decreasing in the endogenous variables at the optimum. A similar observation is valid for lower boundary points in the case of strategic risk-aversion. Note that in the differentiable case, "not being strictly increasing" in the endogenous variable simply means that the optimizer g (z ) ∈ B (Γ(z )) (g (z ) = sup Γ(z ) in the one-dimensional case) satisfies the first-order condition: D x u (g (z ), z ) = 0.
As long as this is the case, there is no problem. So boundary points are admissible maximizers as long as first-order conditions hold. It is only when D x u (g (z ), z ) ≤ 0 at an upper boundary point g (z ) that g cannot be convex (unless it takes the value supZ everywhere).
Concavity of the Constraint Correspondence
Since g (z ) ∈ Γ(z ) for all z ∈ Z , it is clear that Γ must always have a concave selection when the agent is strategically risk-averse (similarly, Γ must have a convex selection when the agent is strategically risk-loving). Naturally, if we can somehow deduce that g must be contained in some subcorre-
for all z , then we only need to assume that this subcorrespondenceΓ is concave. But it is clear that some form of concavity of the constraint correspondence cannot be avoided and in fact concavity is necessary conditioned on the other assumptions of theorem 4. Indeed, consider the optimal policy g (z ) = sup x ∈Γ(z ) x . All assumption of theorem 4 are satisfied if Γ is concave. If Γ is not concave, neither is g (x ) = sup Γ(z ) (theorem 2).
So if Γ is not concave, it is always possible for an optimization problem to satisfy all of the other conditions of theorem 4 and yield a (unique) optimal policy that is not concave.
Quasi-Convex Differences
Next, let us look at the key condition of quasi-concave differences. Consider the one-dimensional case X ⊆ and assume that u (x , z ) is differentiable and strictly concave in x . In addition, assume that the (unique) optimal policy g (z ) lies in the interior of Γ(z ) for all z ∈ Z . When all of these conditions are satisfied, we can characterize g via the first-order condition: 29
Here D x u (x , z ) is of course precisely the marginal payoff function whose quasi-concavity is equivalent to quasi-concave differences of u (theorem 3). Consider now the graph of g , Gr(g ) =
The following way of viewing the problem by looking at the graph of the optimal policy fails under the general conditions of theorem 4, and it fails spectacularly in the multi-dimensional case because the optimal policy's graph cannot be characterized from the first-order conditions even under strict convexity, differentiability, and interiority. Therefore the present discussion should only be taken as indicative. Yet, when speaking of necessity/tightness, we are excused for focusing on the most well-behaved case (any generalization must obviously include the most well-behaved cases if they are to include anything at all!) hence the set that lies at or below the graph (the lower epigraph) is given by:
Since a function is concave if and only if its lower epigraph is convex, g will be a concave function if and only if {(z , x ) : D x u (x , z ) ≥ 0} is a convex subset of Z × X . It is clear that a sufficient condition for this is that D x u (x , z ) is quasi-concave in (x , z ), i.e., that u exhibits quasi-concave differences in (x , z ). But it is also clear that this is not a necessary condition because quasi-concavity amounts to having {(z , x ) : D x u (x , z ) ≥ r } convex for all real r , whereas here we only need it to hold for r = 0. But if we look at the situation locally, it is easy to see that quasi-concavity is both necessary and sufficient for convexity under the previous conditions, precisely: g will be concave at a given point z ∈ Z if and only if D x u (x , z ) is locally quasi-concave at (g (z ), z ) (which is the same as saying that we must insert the x for which D x u (x , z ) = 0 and check for quasi-concavity in a neighborhood of (x , z )). So quasi-concave differences in the neighborhood of (g (z ), z ) is both necessary and sufficient for local concavity of g in the present situation.
While the previous discussion does indicate that quasi-concave differences is a "tight" condition, it is slightly misleading to look at the local situation vis-a-vis necessity for global results. This is because we may have more information at our disposal not only locally (where we are implicitly using in the previous argument that D x u (x , z ) = 0 must hold) but also globally. Recall from theorem 4 that in the strategic risk-averse case, lower boundary points cannot be maximizers unless u (·, z ) is locally non-decreasing at such points. It follows from this that when u is differentiable, x ∈ G (z ) ⇒ D x u (x , z ) ≥ 0 (whether or not x lies in the interior of Γ(z )). Thus we can without loss of generality, replace Γ(z ) with the correspondenceΓ(z ) = Γ(z ) ∩ {x ∈ X : D x u (x , z ) ≥ 0}. When we then apply theorem 4 (now withΓ in place of Γ), we can replace X ×Z with the set A = {(x , z ) ∈ X ×Z : D x u (x , z ) ≥ 0}
and if u exhibits quasi-concave differences on A (which in particular will ensure that A is convex and thatΓ has convex values), theorem 4 will go through (as will indeed theorem 5). For easy referencing we summarize in a theorem:
Theorem 13 (Weakened Conditions in the Differentiable Case) If u (x , z ) is differentiable in x , the conclusions of theorems 4-5 remain valid if in case 1. u instead of quasi-concave differences on X × Z is merely assumed to exhibit quasi-concave differences on the subset A = {(x , z ) ∈ X × Z : D x u (x , z ) ≥ 0} ⊆ X × Z , and in case 2. u instead of quasi-concave differences on X × Z is merely assumed to exhibit quasi-concave differences on the subset A = {(x , z ) ∈ X × Z :
At least at first look, this is a true generalization, and it deserves to be spelled out explicitly because lemma 2 precisely gives conditions under which a function exhibits quasi-concave differences on a set such as A. But is it truly a generalization? Yes or no, depending on how one looks at it.
In particular, all that is really happening here is that we take a given problem where we have more information (differentiability) and recast it more tightly after which we then use theorem 4 or 5.
Quasi-concavity
The chosen definition of quasi-convex/quasi-concave differences is a local condition: In definition 3, the quasi-convexity statement is required to hold for δ > 0 close to 0 but not for all δ > 0. This choice is motivated by theorem 3 which is crucial for practical applications. Now, it will come as no surprise that with only a local condition, we need additional global structure on the payoff function to prove anything. And this is where quasi-concavity of u (x , z ) in x comes in. As seen from the proof of the theorems, quasi-concavity plays an integral role. This does not mean that it is necessary in any strict sense of the term however. In fact, it becomes irrelevant if we are willing to replace the definitions of quasi-concave and quasi-convex differences with their global versions (see the first paragraph after definition 3). The straight-forward verification of the previous claim is left to the reader. 30 As mentioned when quasi-concave differences was compared to increasing differences (see footnote 11), the global version is actually the direct parallel to increasing differences which also requires that the statement hold for all δ > 0. And it must be said that there is something very aesthetically pleasing about using the global definition in place of this paper's preferred notion of quasi-convex differences. In particular, this leads to results that more directly those of monotone comparative statics (which do not require quasi-concavity either). The problem is that unlike in the case of increasing differences, there seems to be no easy way to verify that a function exhibits quasi-concave differences globally (this does not mean that there is no way to do so, of course, only that this author did not find one). At the more intuitive level, this is really not all that surprising: A correspondence that has a concave or convex selection also has a continuous selection (any convex or concave function is continuous on the interior of its domain). Quasi-concavity implies that the policy correspondence has convex values, and it is hard to imagine any general, workable result that would predict a continuous selection without convex values. Yet, further research is clearly required in order to settle this discussion. u (g (z ) , z ) will be concave [convex] and so the result follows directly from the definition of the convex order (the mean-preserving spread order). 2. If, in addition to the assumptions under 1., g is also increasing, it is clear that u (g (z ), z ) will be increasing and concave [increasing and convex, respectively]. The results therefore once again follow directly from the definitions of the orders, here the second-order stochastic dominance and convex-increasing orders, respectively. 3. Since η x 's distribution is the image measure of η under g , f (x )η x (d x ) = f (g (z ))η(d z ) for any function f : X → such that the integral is well-defined. The statement therefore once again follows directly from the definition of the second-order stochastic dominance order. 4. Precisely as 3. except now f (g (·)) will be convex whenever f is increasing and convex and g is convex (and so a mean-preserving spread to η implies a convex-increasing order increase in η x ). 5. For the fifth claim, use that when g in addition to being concave, is also increasing, the composition f (g (·)) will be increasing and concave whenever f is increasing and concave. For the claim in square brackets, use that f (g (·)) will be concave and decreasing when f is concave and increasing and g is concave and decreasing, hence − f (g (·)) will be concave and increasing and so
when η is subjected to a convex-increasing order increase. 6. This case is dual to 5. and is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 3
"⇒": Since D x j u (x , z ) = lim δ→0 u (x +δε j ,z )−u (x ,z ) δ where ε j denotes the j 'th unit vector, and quasiconvexity is preserved under pointwise limits (Johansen (1972) ), each partial derivative D x j u (x , z )
will be quasi-convex at (x , z ) when u exhibits quasi-convex differences at (x , z ). "⇐": This direction is not easy. The idea is to prove the contrapositive by contradiction (note that since quasi-convexity is not preserved under integration, we cannot use the fundamental theorem of calculus as one can often do in this kind of situation). So we assume that u does not exhibit quasi-convex differences, that each partial derivative D x j u (x , z ) is quasi-convex, and then derive a contradiction. For α ∈ [0, 1] set x α ≡ αx 0 + (1 − α)x 1 and z α = αz 0 + (1 − α)z 1 . Say that u exhibits quasi-convex differences in the direction η > 0 at (x 0 , z 0 , α) if for all δ n > 0 in some neighborhood of 0:
It is easy to see that if u exhibits quasi-convex differences (on all of X × Z ), then it exhibits quasiconvex differences in all directions η > 0 at all (x , z , α) ∈ X × Y × [0, 1]. Let ε j denote the j 'th unit vector (a vector with 1 in the j 'th coordinate and zeroes everywhere else). Since a function is quasi-convex in all directions if and only if it is quasi-convex in all unit/coordinate directions ε j , we may (as always) restrict attention to the directions of the coordinates in the previous statement. Hence if u does not exhibit quasi-convex differences, there will exist a coordinate direction ε j , (x 0 , z 0 ), (x 1 , z 1 ) ∈ X × Y ,α ∈ [0, 1] and a sequence δ n ↓ 0 such that for all n: u (xα + δ n ε j , zα) − u (xα, zα) > max{u (x 0 + δ n ε j , z 0 ) − u (x 0 , z 0 ), u (x 1 + δ n ε j , z 1 ) − u (x 1 , z 1 )} (34)
Note that we necessarily haveα ∈ (0, 1) when the previous inequality holds. Intuitively, the inequality says that there exists a point (x α , z α ) on the line segment between (x 0 , z 0 ) and (x 1 , z 1 ) at which u (· + δ n ε j , ·) − u (·, ·) takes a strictly higher value than at any of the endpoints. Now, divide through (34) with δ n and take limits:
